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SOCIAL CONTROL. VI.

IDEALS.

IN a small and very simple group like the family, sept or tribe, that *sense of being related* which is the moral core of religion may do very well as a basis for harmonious living. But for a large and highly organized society acquired sympathy has just the shortcomings I pointed out in a spontaneous sympathy in the first paper of this series. It establishes general bonds and sees to it that no social class is exploited or left behind, but it is not fit to be charged with the immediate regulation of men. The reason for this lies in the nature of the social order.

Taking the society we are in, this social order presents itself as a system of active individuals, unlike in respect to dependence, desires, abilities and occupation, engaged in the strenuous pursuit of personal ends, but nevertheless so ordering their activities and conduct as to realize a certain equilibrium which can be indefinitely maintained. People are constantly dropping out of this system, new people are constantly maturing into it, and these after entering frequently change their places in it. But whatever be a person's place in the system, there are required of him in that place certain definite relations to other persons and to other parts of the system. The individual as daughter is to defer in certain ways, as wife must assume certain relations of mutuality, as mother is expected to become care-taker of her children, as nurse is called upon to meet unflinchingly certain responsibilities. As one passes from youth to manhood, from minority to citizenship, from study to work, from bachelor to father, from subordinate to chief, many definite changes at once take place in social requirement. At times these requirements are so unlike as to call up precisely opposite sentiments. Consider the contrast between the individual as diplomat and as man of science, as advocate and as judge, as business man and

as priest, as soldier and as nurse, as section boss and as kindergarten, as policeman and as tutor, as bill collector and as Sunday-school superintendent. The kindness that society desires of the pastor is no twin to the vigorous competition it expects of the business man. Running religion on business principles and running business on religious principles prove equally disastrous. Nor is the disciplinary severity of the warden akin to the tenderness of the "Salvation lassie," though each is suited to its function.

Unlimited altruism is, in fact, wholly unsuited to hold every one unswervingly to the special activities and forbearances belonging to his particular position in the social system. Such an adjustment of each to the demands of the social order as shall insure equilibrium flows not from a vague altruism but from a particular way of regarding these requirements. However contrasted the sentiments that go with the function of the jailer and that of the nurse, both functions can be looked upon and discharged as *duties*.

The spirit of love, whether born of fellowship or of faith, is everywhere at work abolishing flogging in the navy, abbreviating penal codes, rooting out slavery, averting or humanizing war, lifting the plane of business competition, relaxing the rigor of industrial discipline, softening the treatment of children in home or school, ameliorating the lot of dependents and defectives, injecting sweetness into manners and trimming the claws of theological dogma. It is the source of constant improvement in the social order. It continually revises the standard of requirement for the various positions in the system. But it is not the immediate parent of that orderliness that day by day harmonizes the activities of thousands of men. It is not the force that holds each individual in the orbit marked out for him in an organized group.

This view of social order is confirmed by Alexander. "This system of social relations . . . implies similarity and diversity of functions among its members. Many fight, and many work, and many govern; and there are some needs so general that

morality makes similar requirements of all—temperance, and justice, and the like—but has his own individual place, and holds it through preserving a right relation to those who are like and to those who are unlike himself. Morality makes the best of the endless repetition it finds in the natural beings called men, and marshals them to their place in a system of relations, the meaning of each of which is present to their consciousness.”¹

The enlistment of the feelings on behalf of impersonal functions and requirements is effected chiefly by the elaboration of social patterns or types, which tend to become the guiding ideals of the members of society. This method of causing righteousness to abound is the method of *morality*.

The corner stone of this form of social control is the fact that men have feelings of love or hatred, of admiration or of contempt, for traits of character. Just as we are attracted or repelled by odors, colors, forms, scenes, deeds or doctrines, so we are affected by the qualities of people. Some love impetuosity; others admire cool deliberation. Some are drawn toward the compliant; others toward the strong will. Some bow to cleverness; others to tenacity of purpose: Passionate natures have their admirers, but so do contemplative ones. The self-assertion that angers one intimidates another and charms a third. Why people have these preferences the sociologist is not called upon to explain, any more than in treating of marriage he is called upon to account for the vagaries of preference between the sexes.

Whether as the offspring of the instinctive will to live or as the result of living closer to our own choices and efforts than to those of others,² we have naturally a high self-esteem. But with the advent of reflection self-esteem comes to be bound up in a measure with a more or less critical and objective self-judgment. We get the power to stand off and look upon and pass judgment on ourselves. In such cases self-esteem lifts its head when we

¹ ALEXANDER, *Moral Order and Progress*, p. 127-8.

² JAMES, *Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 326-7.

see in ourselves that which we consider estimable, droops when we see in our own qualities or character, or abilities or achievements nothing we can hold dear. Shame and self-loathing appear when we must confess to that in ourselves which inspires scorn or disgust when seen in others.¹

A high estimate of one's self, the sense of rare worth or excellence, is a source of distinct pleasure and exhilaration. It is bound up with the feeling of power, a poignant consciousness of self, a vivid feeling of being alive and of triumphing, which elates and rejoices. Self-contempt, on the other hand, is attended by slow heart beats, reduced circulation, drooping of spirits and a sense of oppression and anguish.

From this it follows that men will aspire to that which they deem precious in order to possess it and make it their own. Whether something outward, such as dress, ornament, retinue, title or genealogy; or something personal, such as grace, beauty, strength or dexterity; or something inward, such as courage, temperance, *savoir faire*, manners, erudition, conversational ability, eloquence or fidelity—it remains true that the thing or quality one admires one strives to acquire. Admiration, therefore, has a real dynamic power. It is a transforming agent of the first order, seeing that the object of admiration becomes the goal of endeavor. In the field of character, what is admired becomes the ideal toward which one strives. To control ideals, therefore, is to control character.

The main original factors of one's admirations and abominations are instinct and idiosyncrasy on the one hand and social environment on the other. For most men it is the social *milieu* that gives us the key to their dominant emotional reactions. In one circle the bruiser is admired, in another the dandy, in another the priest. The soldier, the organizer or the thinker—each has his following. An outsider introduced into one of these circles finds it difficult not to adopt the tone and take the hue of his

¹“That *we dislike in others things which we tolerate in ourselves* is a law of our æsthetic nature about which there can be no doubt. But as soon as generalization and reflection step in, this judging of others leads to a new way of regarding ourselves.”
—JAMES, *Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 435.

immediate environment. The nature habituated to certain kinds of response may hold out against the social influence; but the young quickly succumb to the reiterated suggestions of their associates. Herein lies the assimilative power of societies. Besides the infection with speech, dress or manner, there is the more subtle infection of the newcomer with the master likes and dislikes of the group.

While most of the reaction habits acquired are caught up by imitation, there are admirations and abhorrences that are impressed for a purpose. In other words, society, besides unwittingly or carelessly influencing its members, deliberately sets to work to affect their feelings in certain ways with a view to control. This is done by steadily holding up before a man that which he is to admire and by studiously disparaging that which he is to scorn and abhor. By thus orienting his feelings society determines what ideals shall rule his endeavor and shape the development of his character. Here, then, we have a method of molding people to the social pattern. It is scarcely necessary to add that society will seek to excite admiration for that in deed and in character which is deemed socially fit, and repugnance for that which is too egoistic, foreign, reactionary, radical or eccentric to suit its purpose.

Recent ethics has glimpsed the sway of ideals over conduct and seen how these in turn depend on one's admirations and detestations. But the significance of it all is hidden by a lame analysis. The socializing ideals that are found actually reigning in the lives of many people are spoken of as "social ideals." Ethics thus implies that, being the ideals guiding the mass of men at a given time, they are communicated by social influence to each new member of the community. If this is the process, we cannot help wondering how the mass of men ever came to follow these ideals that so often lead them aside from the smooth paths of instinct and spontaneity over the rough road of self-denial. Scientific explanation of this ethics has nowhere given.

There is, of course, such a thing as a collective or social ideal. So might we speak of the aspirations of crusading Europe, of

Omer's Arabs, of Garibaldi's Italy, Kossuth's Hungary or New Japan. A Society of Jesus or a Civic League has a goal toward which it presses. But an ideal that guides the lives of many members of a society is not therewith a social ideal. As in an army there are held up standards of obedience, endurance, and bravery, which become ideals for its members, but which for the army as a whole are mere means to an end and not at all to be identified with its ideals of achievement, so society gives its members ideals which are in no wise ideals for society as a whole.

Let us therefore not fail to distinguish "type" from "ideal." Society gets up certain patterns, which as they are framed in the interest of the group, may be termed "social types." In a differentiated society, there are many of them and they are unlike. These if persistently held up may become in the course of time ideals—each for the class for which it is intended. By making distinct these stages in the process we are enabled to see that the presence of self-control, fidelity, and devotion in the types held up for imitation in a community by no means evidences these qualities in the character of the group that frames these types. A social type may be lofty because the character of society is high, or simply because the mechanism of control is perfect. It is, indeed, perfectly possible for the pattern conduct of a community of grasping men to embrace fair play and respect for ownership. It is just because the types contrived and set up are higher than the actual feelings and standards of society that they can achieve a moral uplift.

It will here be objected that such a differentiation of social type from private standard will do no good. The trick is too thin, the legerdemain too transparent. By no such device can the stream be made to rise higher than its source. Either the social type agreed upon imposes on nobody and is hence ineffective, or it imposes on the framers of it and is therefore a social ideal.

We escape this paradox by recognizing three great social facts—the functional differentiation of society, the division into leaders and led, and the sway of the past over the present. To

see these in the concrete, consider how it is that the soldier comes to regard as despicable that prudent concern for one's safety which is instinctive and which is commended in other walks of life. There is first the fact that contempt of danger, little needed elsewhere, is absolutely necessary to the business of fighting. Those dependent on the success of the fighting force, *i. e.*, all the rest of society, will see to it that courage is emphasized in the soldier type. Secondly, the leaders of the soldiers, whether self-devoted or not, perceiving that professional success with all the glory and personal aggrandizement it brings depends on the inspiring of courage in their men, will impress this quality with a zeal certainly no less than that of an advocate for his client or a politician for his party. In the third place, courage bepraised and besung in one generation will shine before the eyes of the next generation with a prestige it could never have acquired in a day.

This last fact should be dwelt on. For it is chiefly by being handed down embedded in transmitted culture — literature, art, religion, codes, discipline, systems of morals — that types of character developed in the social interest win such authority and prestige that they are accepted as ideals, not merely by the led, but even by the leaders and guides of society. This lifting of social type higher than actual social character, which might at first appear to be mere shallow artifice, is therefore, in reality the outcome of a long social growth. It is from the summit of twenty centuries of myth and legend, song and story, faith and aspiration that certain types of today look down upon us. Social control is based not only on the ascendancy of the many over the one, of the wise over the simple, of the rulers over the ruled, but yet more on the domination of the living by the dead.

We have yet to show how the individual is induced to admire the social type. What is meant by "holding up" a pattern?

Let us consider how the social model of a soldier embodying such elements as courage, prowess, endurance, fidelity, frankness, loyalty, self-sacrifice, none of them easy for ordinary human

nature, is so impressed on great numbers of ordinary folk as to become for them an imperious ideal. Where as in militant societies, or in industrial societies during war time, military qualities are deemed all-important, we find that all manner of homage is paid to the soldier type. Literature glorifies it, eloquence crowns it, religion canonizes it, multitudes applaud and cheer it. Everywhere that type is honored, revered, sung, and praised. Healths and toasts are drunk to the soldier; women smile on him; men bow down to him. Art, literature, oratory, worship, monuments, statues, festivals, commemorations, and observances unite in perpetually reminding men of soldier qualities, exploits, and prizes.

Besides these streams of suggestion all playing on one point, admiration is further kindled by flashing before the dazzled eye those aspects of the soldier's life which are adventurous, dramatic, or picturesque, while carefully keeping in the background its cruelties, hardships, and agonies; by gracing it with attractive imagery; by expurgating history of the horrors of war and literature of all disparagement of the soldier; by referring to soldier worth on the most momentous and solemn occasions; by bringing it forward when habitual self-interested prudence is thrown off its guard in a sudden rush of emotion; by getting it associated with all that is beautiful or holy; by identifying it with the defense of the roof-tree from the torch, of ancestral graves from the vandal, of women from the ravisher, and of children from the destroyer.

By thus marshaling every influence and by using for leverage every inclination and passion of the human heart it is possible to achieve wonderful results. And yet I have recited but a tithe of the ways in which a transmitted type is gradually stamped upon the rising generation. To set them all forth would be to describe the making of man. Of Chinese education Professor Mary S. Barnes says: "The influence of conscious education is mighty. In this study we have seen this environment actually *making* men, and constantly making men—millions of them, after a desired pattern."¹

¹ *History of Education*, No. III.

The diversity of conduct and character required in the highly differentiated society is so great that if it were sought to use one concrete type for all this type would be so generalized as to be valueless. How few are the moral elements that the schoolboy, the scout, the mother, the bank clerk, the boss, the nurse, and the stock jobber have in common! How unlike the qualities that will make each one *good* of his or her kind! The variety of place and function is therefore met by a certain variety of type. In an advanced society there is quite an elaborate hierarchy of types answering to all the principal and many of the minor situations of life. Besides such patterns as the son, the lover or the father maintained on behalf of the family, we shall find types of the friend, the neighbor, the partner, the business man, the teacher, the servant, the policeman, the citizen. However fluid and indistinct in the literature and debate of the day where variants get most of the attention, these types will be found quite definite for each family or neighborhood. Vague though they may seem for the whole nation, they are precise enough for each little local group; and it is just in such little groups that everybody is born and raised. These types, then, are very real things in the lives of people. A girl is impressed at home with the daughter pattern, at school with the pupil pattern, with her teens she is confronted with the young lady type and later she encounters the reigning standard of wife and mother.

If, however, she varies her life to the extent of becoming saleswoman, milliner, or accountant, she finds no specialized model held up to her. This brings us to the truth that the molds provided by society are, after all, few, while nowadays the variety of situation and requirement is all but infinite. It would seem, then, that this species of control is useless for detail regulation. But this difficulty has been triumphantly met. Symmetrical types complete in every feature are provided only for the chief positions which one may occupy. For the rest society by dissecting and comparing normal conduct for all sorts of exigencies in the social system brings to light certain resemblances. Social conduct under all sorts of conditions is found to repeat

a few general qualities. Social character at a thousand points in society can be resolved into a few simple elements. Therefore after the ground plan of society has been laid down in its special types, it is possible to confine the rest of regulation to patterns of qualities and elements of character. For each of these few elements a type is framed and held up to admiration that the individual may consent to incorporate it into his ideal. These abstract types are the moral virtues. By this analysis we get such generalized forms as honesty, justice, truth, fullness, fidelity, kindness, self-denial, loyalty, sincerity, courage, perseverance, temperance, etc. Society no longer bids the taskmaster not to "strip the temples of their stores," "diminish the substance consecrated to the gods," "carry off the cakes and bandages of mummies," "over-value or diminish the supplies," or "cheat in the weights of the balance," as it did in Old Egypt. It simply bids him "be honest." The guidance of men by such abstractions presupposes in them the power to recognize the abstract in the concrete and is, therefore, not without its drawbacks and dangers.

The analysis of fit character in all manner of positions bringing to light uniformities which are erected into virtues and made the reigning ideals for individual life must be deemed one of the greatest inventions in the history of societies. Its economy is that of the alphabet. There by analyzing spoken words into their simplest sound elements we are enabled to reduce the number of written characters from thousands to a little over a score; these in turn must be variously combined in order to form the multitude of written words required. Here by analyzing social characters into their ultimate elements we can make a few virtues do the work of many concrete types; but these virtues must be combined in varying degrees and proportions in order to give the variety of guidance needed in the social system. The social gain is vast. In all early societies that reached a settled social order we find elaborate codes specifying what is standard conduct for all the chief places and functions. The bringing up of each man to the highly specific

ethic of his status and calling tended to confirm caste, lessen mobility and discourage variation. Such societies had to throttle progress, for with change in the number, strength or relation of the orders of men in society the elaborate patterns ceased to fit and morality collapsed. It is the bringing up of people to love and imitate generalized social qualities and generalized social character that, more than any other improvement in this department of social evolution, has given control an elasticity favorable at once both to order and to progress.

Of the concrete types elaborated strictly for the social rather than for the family group there are three which on account of the social energy that has gone to perfect and to glorify them, stand preëminent. These are the *gentleman* (or *lady*), the *soldier* and the *priest*. Each of these, instead of being a mere synthesis of abstract virtues, has been worked out into the most amazing detail by past generations and becomes so embalmed in tradition and literature as to constitute a formative influence of the first rank. The "gentleman," originally the quintessence of sociality worked out within the highest caste, has won the admiration of many, and is today in America the ideal of the aspiring millions of democracy. Low indeed must we descend in the social scale to find common the man who does not wince at being told he is "no gentleman." Religion itself hardly does more in molding lives at the present moment in our democracy than this single fascinating figure. The union of this type to the primeval type of "man" (or "woman") that for centuries supplied the chief guiding ideal for the humble workaday millions—the serfs, villeins and peasants — is a long forward stride in moral progress.

Priest and soldier, on the other hand, are not universal types. They have been the concern of society partly because the due discharge of religious and military functions has seemed of highest moment to the common welfare, but still more because the demands of these professions go so much against the grain of the average individual. To develop the courage, obedience, endurance and loyalty of the warrior, or the gentleness, self-

denial, chastity and piety of the priest, human nature had to be overlaid with an artificial nature. As the task was difficult the means had to be powerful, and thus it is that these types have been worked out to a distinctness and backed up with an authority we find nowhere else. The most powerful known agencies — poetry, song, eloquence, applause — are summoned to uphold and commend them. So forcibly in consequence is the type stamped on the individual, so deeply is it graven, that he retains an enduring impress of it in his thought and feeling. A certain arrest of development treads on the heels of this specialization. The thought of the soldier or the priest cannot wander much beyond the range marked out by his type. Either can do scientific detail work but very rarely does either do first-class thinking on social, religious or philosophical subjects — those, namely, about which he has been trained to think and feel in a particular way.

Every religion, when it is an independent stream of influence sweeping in from without or springing up in the footsteps of some great teacher, must be recognized as making its own contribution to the general stock of ideals in society. Each apart from its supernatural sanctions or its teachings respecting the bonds between men offers its pattern lives, characters, qualities and virtues so set forth in narratives, examples, parables, legends, myths and sayings as to win and hold the love of generations of men. Indeed a religion like that of Confucius, almost devoid of supernaturalism or idealism, touches the feelings on behalf of society chiefly by the attractive power of its model characters and virtues. The Norse myths form the proper mold in which to shape the spirit of the warrior. Mazdeism was but a pedestal to lift purity into the upper heavens. "The spirit of Shinto," says Mr. Hearn, "is the spirit of filial piety, the zest of duty, the readiness to surrender life for a principle without a thought of wherefore. It is the docility of the child; it is the sweetness of the Japanese woman."^{*} Stoicism was in essence a wrought-out character-type fortified by philosophical doctrines and made

^{*} *Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan*, Vol. II, p. 388.

fascinating by the genius of Epictetus. Buddha gave an irresistible charm to unselfishness, self-control, serenity. Jesus conferred on meekness, love, forgiveness and purity a luster that has led captive the hearts of millions. As it is the concrete that moves the world the force of a religion lies less in its framed ideals than in its realized ideals, that is, the types presented incarnate in its founders, heroes or saints. Fleckless, flawless pattern-lives clothed with a more than human prestige are the priceless possessions of a religion.

Besides these chief types carefully constructed and strongly fortified society employs many subordinate types to effect the minor adjustments of the individual to the group. The framing of these is the work not of society but of the minor group most directly conversant with the function thus regulated — usually the trade or profession. The lawyers in their intercourse, their papers and discussions, their legal books and periodicals, their bar associations, and their law schools arrive at a professional ethics which sketches out the type that becomes the ideal of those lawyers imbued with the “professional” spirit. So teachers, clergymen, physicians, civil engineers, artists or actors, by agreeing among themselves as to what is praiseworthy and what disreputable, control the feelings and consequently the endeavor of the individual. Likewise drummers, conductors, typesetters, glassblowers or pilots communicate to each other standards of excellence which become trade types. Every “service” — military, naval, civil, hospital, medical, customs, quarantine, revenue, police, life saving, detective, telegraph, railroad, or missionary — acquires in time traditions, stories, anecdotes, precedents, maxims and sayings which conspire to delineate and glorify its type. It is this power to subdue the initiate to its standards that marks the bureaucracy. When a service is originated, say the Franciscan Order or the Salvation Army, the inspiration of its members comes from the magnetic charm and the ascendant personality of its founder. The raw recruit is transformed by the enthusiasm and aspirations of a St. Francis or a General Booth. But with age the vitality of an order comes to reside in its

models or ideals which each member has accepted for himself and seeks to communicate to the novice.

Every sect, party, church, brotherhood, order, crew, camping party, surveying corps, ball club, athletic team, labor union, fraternity, guild, lodge, or other minor grouping based not on mere likeness but on recurrent relations and interactions, will in course of time develop for its special purposes appropriate types of character, conduct or observance which exert on its members an invisible pressure subordinating them to the welfare or aims of the association. In other words, the minor groups of men resemble the great social group in needing to control their units and in the means they employ for this purpose. We have pointed out the need of a succession of generations for perfecting a social type and giving it prestige. So of minor groups it is only the stabler ones with a succession of memberships that are able to create a distinctive atmosphere.

Below the associations each with its "genius" or "*esprit*," and the trades and professions each with its standard are the innumerable callings in which those engaged have never been in such close touch as to arrive at a consensus of admiration for this or that practice. Here there are no special guiding types and each must do his work as he is led by the general moral types offered by society or driven by considerations of self-interest.

The special ethical standards that associations, professions and trades impart to their members may be said in the main to constitute social types and to be among the agents of social control. They are usually worked out under the oversight and criticism of the public. If they run counter to the general social interest they excite hostility. If the profession fails to amend, its type will be stripped of prestige by being confronted with those general types that are backed up by the full authority of society, past and present, *i. e.*, the ruling moral standards. This is not to affirm, however, that the professional ethic is always what it would be if it grew up in the full light of publicity, nor to deny that the reigning standards of a minor group may at times flout the general interest and aim covertly at the aggrand-

izement of one set of social functionaries at the expense of other groups.

So much for the objective side. Turning now to the subjective side let us study the type as ideal. The force that is relied on to hold the individual to his ideals is self-respect, self-reverence on the one hand, shame and loss of self-respect on the other; these together constituting a self-acting system of rewards and punishments. Compared with applied rewards and punishments they have the merit of dispensing with inquest and award by external authority, of being certain in operation, of regulating men when unobserved, of appraising motive as well as deed and of shaping character as well as conduct.

The lofty independence of this righteousness lifted far above calculations of gain or loss or desire for approval¹ has won the admiration of thinkers in all ages. It was the supreme aim of stoic morality. Said Marcus Aurelius: "When thou hast done a good act and another has received it, why dost thou still look for a third thing besides these, as fools do, either to have the reputation of having done a good act or to obtain a return." It is the goal of the great modern teachers.² "The hero fears not," says Emerson, "that if he withhold the avowal of a just and brave act it will go unwitnessed and unloved. One knows it—himself—and is pledged by it to sweetness of peace and to nobleness of aim." In high contrast to those lives regulated by the prospect of heaven and hell stand those lives governed by ideas. Dispensing with belief in a future state³ they demand simply belief in one's self.⁴ Neither reposing on dogma nor responding to self-interest⁵ they give a security for lasting goodness that seems absolute.

¹ "Suppose any man shall despise me. Let him look to that himself. But I will look to this, that I be not discovered doing or saying anything deserving of contempt."—Marcus Aurelius.

² "Self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control,
These three alone lead life to sovereign power."—Tennyson.

³ "Man's ignorance as to what will become of him after he dies never disturbs a noble, a truly religious soul."—Salter.

⁴ "The fearful unbelief is unbelief in thyself."—Carlyle.

⁵ "Can he really be honest, can he be called really virtuous who would gladly give himself up to his favorite vices if he feared no future punishment?"—Kant.

In contrast with supernaturalism control by ideals inspires pride rather than humility.¹ Strangely enough egoism is here the soil out of which the social virtues spring, the well from which they are watered. Realization of the ideal is regarded as one more step toward perfection, the winning of a new personal excellence which naturally excites self-admiration. That this may lead to self-vaunting is true. We must put up with stoic arrogance² for it is after all a little enough price to pay for right conduct. By various devices—chiefly by keeping the ideal always well ahead of performance, or by incorporating modesty into the ideal itself—it is possible to cure this defect.

Its dependence on pride explains why it is that control by ideals often flourishes in the higher classes while the inferior orders are curbed by custom and authority. Always in aristocracies, nobilities, higher social castes and military orders pride is of necessity exaggerated to such a degree that society can get no leverage at all for control unless it uses self as a fulcrum. At a time when supernatural sanctions were woven through and through the European social fabric, chivalry called into being a proud and jealous sense of honor which routed the monastic spirit from castle and court. As the fiery individualism that heralded the great democratic movement awakened the sense of dignity and worth in layer after layer of the people, pride in the sober garb of self-respect was given more and more the custody of virtue. During this transformation honor has assumed a new rôle. Honor was formerly a caste badge. It was that quality which guaranteed one his caste and loss of which meant

¹ "Pride, under such training (that of modern rationalistic philosophy), instead of running to waste, is turned to account. It gets a new name; it is called self-respect. . . . It is directed into the channel of industry, frugality, honesty and obedience, and becomes the very staple of the religion and morality held in honor in a day like our own. It becomes the safeguard of chastity, the guarantee of veracity, in high and low; it is the very household god of the protestant, inspiring neatness and decency in the servant girl, propriety of carriage and refined manners in her mistress, uprightness, manliness and generosity in the head of the family."—J. H. Newman, quoted in Lecky's *History of European Morals*, Vol. II, p. 188.

² "Do thou also then not be greatly proud of thy food and dress, or of any external things, but be proud of thine integrity and good deeds."—Epictetus.

loss of caste. But with the widening sway of social types honor comes to mean the salient or cardinal virtue of each concrete type. Failure to attain this excellence is failure to realize type. Thus for woman honor is identified with chastity, for the soldier it is courage, for the business man it is the meeting of all engagements. The officer who runs away, the gentleman who tells lies, the judge who takes bribes, the pugilist who hits "below the belt," the jockey who "pulls" his mount, the school-boy who "peaches" forfeits his honor. He is taught to feel that by that act he is degraded and *declassé*.

The use of ideals implies a view of human nature diametrically opposed to that of supernaturalism. While there we have doctrines of the fall, of sin and of total depravity, here we have a buoyant confidence in the fundamental goodness of man.¹ Regeneration not by grace but by endeavor² implies that human nature is not fallen or bad. People must be taught that the good or noble they admire they may attain by their own efforts. Vistas of infinite possibility must be opened. Free will must be exalted and fate depreciated. No one is to be so bound by heredity that he may not move upward. Hope and aspiration must be offered the meanest man. The belittling and maligning of human nature must yield to ethical optimism. Man, it is insisted, is "a moral being" and so but achieves his true selfhood by realizing his ideals. It is this set of correlated teachings that underlies the method of "morality."³

There has never been a time when a great deal of life was not regulated by ideals. But looking at the species of control to which the cardinal virtues of the age are intrusted, we can say that the Middle Ages exploited belief, that with the growth of protestantism greater reliance was placed on self-respect, and

¹ "Within is a fountain of good, and it will ever bubble up, if thou wilt ever dig." — Marcus Aurelius.

² "Wipe out thy vain fancies by often saying to thyself: 'Now it is in my power to let no badness be in this soul, nor desire, nor any perturbation at all!' Remember this power which thou hast from nature!" — Marcus Aurelius.

³ "Men talk of 'mere morality,' which is much as if one should say, 'Poor God, with nobody to help him!'" — Emerson.

that with the decay of supernaturalism this motive has become the chief guarantor of social order. As the rationalism of the skeptical eighteenth century undermined the beliefs on which order reposed, a new type of control was sought. This at first supplied ineffectually by sentimentalism, utilitarian morals, juiceless homilies on "the fitness of things" and the inculcation of abstract virtues, was finally wrought out by the new idealism portraying with eloquent words the splendid possibilities of human nature. Kant, Fichte, Carlyle, Mazzini, Ruskin, Cousin, Channing, Martineau, George Eliot, Emerson and Thoreau have so forcefully uttered the master ideas of the new appeal to the individual that the Time-Spirit is thoroughly imbued with them. Thanks to the spell of these great teachers the stupendous moral evolution involved in carrying the masses over from supernaturalism has already in great measure been accomplished in protestant countries, not only with few and relatively unimportant perturbations in the field of conduct, but along with increasing demands of society on the individual. In southern Europe, where the mediating influence of protestant ideas was wanting and where self-respect had not served so long an apprenticeship in the household of religion, the transition has been more disastrous.

The guidance of men by ideals is just the reverse of guidance by authority. When we bind from without, free inquiry, criticism, and unhampered choice are discouraged. We undermine the confidence of the individual in himself and surround the source of intimation with the prestige of antiquity, universality and numbers. But when we bind from within, he must be entertained with the illusion of self-direction even at the very moment he martyrizs himself for an ideal that society has sedulously impressed upon him. His very sacrifice must seem self-assertion, his abnegation as a rounding out of his personality. This type of control, therefore, builds on granite men and granite men are produced by it. It is small wonder Cromwell wanted not "broken down serving men," but "men of spirit" to pit against the cavaliers. He who is master of the secret of impart-

ing ideals can have the pick of the human race for his purposes.

In an age of skepticism and self-assertion it is not the most effective form of control society can lay hand to. At the same time it has the defects of its qualities. Contrasting the oriental social order resting on authority with that of the Occident so largely based on self-respect, Mary S. Barnes says: "The East, on her side, must confess that her systems of education tend to allow, if not to cherish, such faults as servility and double dealing, while they actually crush out the inventor and the variant, in a word, the hope of progress. The West, on her side, must note the fact that her systems develop arrogance, self-conceit, angularity, and eccentricity, and, still more serious arraignment, they actually discourage love, patience and courtesy, in a word, social harmony."¹

Just because it is the ascendant moral force of our time it is hard for many to see that this exquisite and perfected guidance is a form of social control at all. Least of all can "ethics," addressing, as it always does, the individual, and bent on providing him reasons for being good, surrender this, its trump card. The moralists assure us they are not "controlling" the individual, they are simply enlightening him. They are thinking not of the social order, but of what it is best for the individual to strive for. That the *moral values* they point him to should tally with *values for society* is a mere accident. That what it is best for the individual to make himself agrees so exactly with what his particular group would have him be, that the values of the various elements of moral excellence are revised with every change in the situation and need of society, gives them no hint of the truth. On whatever crutches of law, divine retribution, or hell-fire, humanity has hobbled up to its present moral level, it has at last, they tell us, thrown away all such aids and now advances upon its own legs.

But the sociologist must regard the polarizing of the feelings of the individual in regard to carefully-framed social types of character as simply one of the means by which bodies of men

¹ *Studies in Education*, III.

have been brought to get along together harmoniously. It is simpler and more elastic than many of its predecessors. It is peculiarly compatible with that higher evolution of personality society exists for. At present it has more of promise than any of its rivals. It may be the final type of social control. But it is certainly not the final form of sociology.

Self-regard, however transfigured into self-respect, self-reverence and sense of honor, has never been the mainstay of family altruism, nor did it underlie social disposition in the smaller and earlier groups. Two developments have combined to make morality, rather than enlightened altruism, the chief support of our social order. The size of modern societies makes it easier to love a few abstract relations to our fellows than to love our fellows themselves. The increasing division of labor, by removing the discharge of our special functions further and further from the welfare of particular persons, tends to depersonalize our services and so make them duties rather than ministrations. But the adjustment of these two circumstances should not blind us to the nature of that goodness which is above and on the other side of all social control. Social order will rest on artifice till there is joined to the natural altruism we find developing in many families, chiefly through prolonged and intimate contact a clearness of intellectual vision that sees in the upright discharge of the social requirements of every office and station the highest ministry to the welfare of our fellows.

EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY,
California.